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1. Introduction 
Kuznets (1966) defines economic growth as a sustained increase 
in both income per capita and population size. The role of population 
is central not only in the operational or empirical approach of Kuznets, 
but also in the neoclassical theory of growth identified with Solow 
(1958). Phelps (1961, 1966) established the golden rule of capital 
accumulation and dedteed the condition for optimality that the net 
marginal product of eapital per-capita not be less than the rate of 
growth in population. Diamond (1965) provided a microeconomic founda­
tion for aggregate capital accumulation in the context of an overlapping 
generations model from which the identical condition for optimality 
appeared to result. However, unlike Kuznetsis view, economic 
growth theory has not been concerned ~ith population as an outcome of 
the process of economic development. 
This paper analyzes the equilibria of a competitive 
economy within an overlapping generations growth model in which fertility 
is subject to choice at the level of the individual. The model is a 
straightforward extension of the Samuelson (1958) - Diamond (1965) frame­
work, except that agents are assumed to enjoy parenthood,and offspring 
are assuned to consume resources before reaching adulthood (Becker, 1960, 
Willis, 1973)• We first investigate the steady state of this economy and 
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compare its characteristics to those of an equivalent social planner problem. 
Then, in subsequent sections, we characterize possible associations between 
fertility (the rate of population growth) and income per-capita over 
the equilibriUJll time series path of a particular economy and in the_ 
cross-section, i.e., at the steady states of different economies. The 
results demonstrate the flexibility of the model in generating associations 
between population growth and income per-capita that fit the stylized facts 
(e.g., see Kuznets). 
Samuelson (1975) has discussed exogenously given steady state 
optimal population growth in Diamond's overlapping generations growth 
model. Unfortunately, Deardorff (1976) showed that if the production 
function is unbounded, there does not exist a finite stationary capital­
labor ratio or a positive rate of population growth that solve Samuelson's 
planner problem. Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) considered a model of 
population growth where the representative agent has an infinite horizon 
time separable utility function in consumption and "newly born people".1 
Therefore, the long run allocation is similar to that of the social 
planner allocation in Samuelson and in this paper as well. By including 
fertility in the utility function, Razin and Ben-Zion partially avoided 
the indeterminacy problem of Samuelson. 2 
In this paper, each individual derives utility only from own 
consumption and from own children. We show that the allocation of the 
1The motivation for this specification of preferences is that parents 
care about the utility of their offspring. 
21n the planner problem the budget constraint is not convex. Hence, there 
may not exist an interior maximum or a unique solution, even when 
fertility enters the utility function directly (See Razin and Ben-Zion 
footnote 12). 
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social planner in this framework is not characterized by minimizing 
population growth; given reasonable assumptions about preferences, 
fertility occurs as an interior solution of the planner problem. 
Furthermore, as in the case where fertility is exogenous, the competitive 
equilibrium converges either to the Golden Rule or to a stationary path 
where the net marginal product of capital per-capita exceeds the rate of 
population growth. In this regard, results with endogenous population 
growth are not dissimilar to those from conventional competitive growth 
models. Moreover, the planner allocation always satisfies the Golden 
Rule as in the Diamond model. In contrast to the case with exogenous 
fertility, we prove that even when a paper asset is privately valued, 
in which case the economy is on the Golden Rule, the competitive allocation 
is not the same as the planner allocation. Indeed, the competitive 
allocation is characterized by fewer children and more savings than is the 
planner allocation. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that 
each agent can obtain the same rate of return on the paper asset regardless 
of the desired quantity of uwu children, and thus without incurring the 
expense of having own children. Given this, we also demonstrate that a 
voluntary social security program, in which the size of the transfer to 
a particular agent is directly tied to own fertility, leads to the planner 
3
allocation. 
Willis (1980) conjectured that such a program would induce this 
equivalence, arguing by analogy from a model of the extended family 
in which old age security is tied to own fertility. 
3 
4 
In the next section, we present a growth model with endogenous 
fertility. We describe the economy and define the competitive equilibrium. 
In section 3 we present the problem of the social planner and compare the 
stationary competitive and planner allocations. In section 4 we demonstrate 
the propositions of the previous section with an example and provide a 
brief discussion of optimality issues. In the following section, we 
explore the positive aspects of the model. The final section 
summarizes and highlights areas for future research. 
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2. A Growth Model with Endogenous Fertility 
The economy to be studied is a variant of the Samuelson (1958) -
Diamond (1965) overlapping generations growth model. In this section we 
describe the technology, the preferences and the characteristics of the 
decentralized economy. 
The technology is represented by a constant return to scale aggregate 
production function, F(K, L) where K is capital and Lis labor, such that 
f(k) = F(1 
K , 1), f(O) = 0, f'(O) =~,where The single good 
can be either consumed or stored as capital for next period production. 
We assume that capital depreciates at rate o in storage and production. 
Time is discrete and individuals live for three periods; infants, who make 
no decisions in the first period, working ("young") in the second period, 
and retired ("old") in the third period. In the second period individuals 
supply one unit of labor and they decide on their lifetime 
consumption and savings. We assume_that individuals enjoy parenthood and 
they decide about the quantity of own children in the second period of their 
life. Each child born at time t consumes e units of the single good. 
The representative individuals life-time utility function is 
(2.1) 
where Ci(t) is the consumption of a member of generation t at .period 
i + 1 of his/her life, i = 1, 2, and 1 + n(t + 1) is the number of 
children of each member of generation t. The utility function (2.1) 
satisfies the usual concavity and differentiability conditions with 
respect to all variables,as well as the following conditions: 
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(i) 
(ii) as n ~ E - 1 with O < £ < 1 
. av avwhere V i = 1, 2 and v = i = · aci a(l+n)' 3 
Condition (i) ensures that c1 or c2 is never optimally zero. 
Condition (ii) states that the marginal utility of children becomes unbounded 
4 
as the number of children approaches some number less than one. 
The economy at date t=l consists of a given number, N(O), of old 
people and a given number, N(l), of young people, with N(O) and N(l) > 0 • 
Each initial old person is endowed with K(l) units of capital and 
h(O) =Nlto) , H > 0 , units of a paper asset. Since all people are alike 
there are N(t) = (1 + n(t)) N(t-1) young people at each period t > 1. 
Before we discu~s specific market structures, we characterize the 
set of feasible and optimal allocations of this economy. 
4
We ignore the discrete nature of fertility. In addition, this 
condition is crucial in establishing the existenc~ of an interior solution 
to the planner problem discussed below. In particular, we will show that 




An allocation {c (t), c (t-1), n(t+l), K(t+l)} for all t > 11 2 
is feasible if it satisfies 
c (t-1)
2(2.2) c (t) + l+n(t) + (1 + n(t+l))e = f(k(t)) + (1-o)k(t) - (l+n(t+l))k(t+l)1 
where k is per-worker capital. A stationary allocation is defined 
such that the variables in (2.2) are independent of the time index t. 
Definition 
A feasible allocation {c (t), c (t-1), "n(t+l), k(t+l)} for all t > 1
1 2 
is optimal if and only if there does not exist another feasible allocation 
{c (t), c (t-1), n(t+l), k(t+l)} for all t > 1 such that1 2 
and 
(b) > 
with at least one strict inequality. 
This optimality definition maximizes the welfare of the 
representative consumer of each generation and ignores the size of the 
population in the welfare criterion. If n(t) > n(t) fo~ some t, the 
economy with a larger population size would have an inefficient allocation. 
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Hence, the optimal allocation," - ", has less people, and some agents 
are, trivially, worse-off since they don't exist. Usually the two 
allocations will be Pareto non-comparable. We view this implication as 
an important drawback to the above definition of optimality when population 
size is subject to choice. However, this definition follows the 
conventional approach (see Koopmans, 1965 ), and we adopt it even 
though it permits a particular allocation to be inefficient only 
because there are ~ many children. 
In some of our analysis we focus on stationary allocations and 
thus neglect all generations prior to the steady state. For the steady 
state,an optimality definition would consist of condition (a) above as a 
strict inequality for generations that are at the stationary allocation. 
This optimality definition is identical to a social planner problem 
that we formulate and analyze in the next section. 
The Decentralized Economy 
In this section we describe the equilibrium of the competitive 
market when population is subject to choice. Each young of generation t 
saves K(t+l) units of the good for his production at time t+l. He holds 
h(t) units of the paper asset whose price in terms of the consumption good 
at time t is P(t). At time t the individual supplies exactly one 
unit of labor and receives a wage of W(t) in terms of consumption 
goods at time t. At time t+l each old person hires L(t+l) units of 
labor for production using his accumulated capital K(t+l), and consumes 
his capital rent and the non-depreciated quantity of capital. 
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Formally the problem of a young person of generation t who is born 
at time t-1 is to maximize, for all t ~ 1, 
(2.3) 
subject to 
(2.4) c {t) = W{t) - K(t+l)- P{t) h(t) - e(l + n(t+l))1 
(2.5) c {t) = F(K(t+l), L(t+l)) - W(t+l) L(t+l)2 
+ (1 - o) K(t+l) + P(t+l) h(t) 
by choice of c (t), c (t), K(t+l), h(t), n(t+l) and L(t+l).1 2 
The first order necessary conditions for a maximum are 
< O with= if K(t+l) > 0 
s: 
with = if h ( t) . > 0 
< 0 with= if n(t+l) > -1 = 
(2.9) v2[F2 {K(t+l), L(t+l)) - W(t+l))] < 0 with= if L(t+l) > 0 
Observe that (2.9) implies that the real wage is equal to the 
marginal product of labor,and that,if K(t+l), h(t) and P(t) are positive, 
the net rate of return on capital is equal to that on the paper asset. 
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Definition 
A perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium consists of non-negative 
values of W(t), h(t+l), k(t+l), P(t), h(t) and L(t+l) for all t ~ 1, 
that are consistent with the necessary conditions for the maximum problem 
of the young (2.3) and 
(i) N(t+l) • (l+n(t+l)) N(t) is the law of motion for population 
(ii) L(t) N(t-1) = N(t) is the equilibrium demand and supply of labor 
(iii) N(t) h(t) = H is the equilibrium demand and supply of the paper asset. 
A monetary equolibrium (ME) satisfies the above definition with 
P(t) > 0 for all t ~ 1. A non-monetary equilibrium (NME) satisfies the 
above definition with P(t) = 0 for all t > 1.5 Hence, in a NME condition 
(iii) is not necessary. 
A stationary equilibrium (SE) satisfies the above definition where we 
ignore the index t on all variables besides P(t), h(t) an<l N(t) and 
we require that P(t) h(t) • g for all t > 1. Then a stationary monetary 
equilibrium (SME) is a SE where g > 0 and a stationary non-monetary 
equilibrium (SNME) is a SE where g • 0. 




Observe that in SE, c
1
, Ci and n are unchanged for each member of each 
g~neration. Then, the first order necessary conditions for SE with k, 
li-n >·0 can be written as 
(2.10) 
(2.11) with • - if g > 0 • 
(2.12) 
(2.13) f(k) - k f'(k) - W• 0 
Let the supercript "c" correspond to the '\'alues of the real stationary 
variables W, k, n, c2 and c1 for the competitive solution of (2.10) - (2.13}....
Furthermore let "-c" and "c" correspond to the SME and the SNME, 
respectively. Observe that for·SME we require that (2.11) holds in 
equality. It is evident that in SME conditions (i) and (iii) in the 
definition of competitive equilibrium together with g • P(t) h(t) 
P(t+l) -cimply that P(t) • 1 + n • Hence, (2.10) and (2.11) imply that for the 
SME the economy is on the Golden Rule· such that 
C .




As such we show that similar to the case where fertility is exogenous, 
the competitive monetary equilibrium may converge to the Golden 
Rule where the net marginal product of capital per-capita is equal 
to the rate of population growth. In addition,a non-monetary equilibrium may 
converge to a stationary path where the net 111Srginal product of capital 
per-capita exceeds the rate of population growth. Hence, the endogeneity 
of population growth does not alter these characteristics of competitive 
growth models. 
Having described the structure of the model, two areas of analysis 
may be explored. One a~enue is the Social Planner solution to the 
allocation problel!-1 in this economy and the comparison to the decentralized 
economy. A second area of analysis is to explore the positive features of the 
model. In particular, empirical regularities with respect to economic 
growth, population growth, and per-capita income across countries and 
over time should be explicable in the context of the model. We discuss 
these issues in turn. 
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3. The Social Planner and the Competitive Allocation 
It is the tradition in growth models to compare the Social Planner 
solution to that of the competitive equilibrium. In growth 1110dels of the Cass­
Koopmans type in which agents are assumed to be infinitely lived, there is a 
straightforward equivalence between the two allocations. In models where agents 
have finite horizons but the economy exists.forever, there always exists the 
problem of welfare tradeoffs across members of different generations. 
Therefore, unlike the Cass-Koopmans model, here it is not clear what 
we should consider as the problem of the Social Planner. Furthermore, 
there is no equivalence between Pareto optimality in this model (see 
definition in section 2) and the particular Social Planner problem that 
6 
ve discuss in this section. Here we follow Diamond (1965) and Samuelson 
(1975) who characterize the planner problem as a choice between 
stationary allocations where each aenber of each generation has an 
identical utility level. 
Samuelson (197~) solved for the stationary planner allocation of the 
economy described in section 2 ignoring the fertility choice, i.e., maximizing 
(2.1) with respect to c1, and k excluding the third argument of- (2.1),c2 
subject to (2.2) at the stationary allocation with e • o. Given this 
allocation, Samuelson then described the necessary conditions for choosing 
the level of fertility that maximized the utility of the representative agent on 
the stationary path. Samuelson denoted that stationary allocation the Golden 
Golden Rule of population growth and capital accumulation. Deardorff (1976) 
6
Although the planner allocation is Pareto optimal, it does not necessarily 
characterize all optimal allocations. 
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pointed out that if f(k) is ·unbounded, as is the case for a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, the necessary conditions may correspond to a minimum welfare 
level. The fact that there always exists a large k that dominates an interior 
solution is easily seen by setting n = -o in the steady state version of (2.2) 
(e = O), for then the consumption possibility frontier can be expanded indefinitely 
in the steady state with larger and larger levels of savings. Thus, the 
conclusion of the Solow model that population growth should be as small as 
possible J!lay not be different in the Diamond model, contrary to Samuelson's 
conjecture. 
The rationale for including fertility as part of the individual choice 
calculus as is done here is based on the view that optimal fertility can only be a 
meaningful concept where there exists a mechanism to achieve such a goal. 
Notice that in (2.2), setting n(t+l) • -G (e rl O) also leads to an 
unbounded consumption possibilities frontier. It must therefore be the case 
that the marginal utility of children becomes infinite at a level of n 
larger than -o, which given condition (ii) in the specification of 
V(·) in section 2 implies that E > 1 - ~. 







, 1 + n) 
subject to 
(3.2) C = W - T -(1 + n)k - e(l + n)
1 
(3. 3) = (1 + n) f(k) - (17 n)(W - T) + (1 + n)(l - o)kc2 
k > 0, n > -1 
Notice that (3.2) and (3.3) together are a particular decomposition of the feasibili 
condition (2.2) at the stationary allocation. Wmay be considered a wage payment to 
labor and T a lump-sum transfer between generations. We employ this 
decomposition in order to facilitate comparisons between the planner's solution 
and the decentralized economy solution as it is deGcr~bcd in section 2. In the 
framework as written, for given W the transfer (T) may be either negative (a tax on 
the old) or positive (a subsidy to the old). Later, we will consider a 
modification of the planner's problem in which T > 0 is imposed for a 
particular W; otherwise W - T could be replaced ly a sinr,le variable or 
we could combine (3.2) and (3.3) into a single constraint, the 
feasibility constraint given by (2.2) at the steady state. 
Now, for any W > O a planner stationary allocation (PSA) satisfies 
the following first order necessary conditions of problem (3.1), where we 
assume interior solutions for k, T and n. 
( 3.4) 
av 
ak = .. 0 
( 3. 5) 
av
(3 .6) - z:: = 0an 
16 
Given our assumptions about the utility function, it is easy to impose sufficient 
that the interior solution to (3.4) - (3.6) correspondsconditions to e.nsure 
to a maximum. Below we analyze the case of Cobb-Douglas utility and production 
functions with full depreciation (6 • 1) and show the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of an interior solution. 
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In the Diamond framework it has been established that if the stationary 
competitive equilibrium is on the Golden Rule (monetary equilibrium) then 
this equilibrium is identical to the planner allocation. To see that, recall 
that the Diamond model is identical to that of this paper if fertility is 
are identicalnot a choice, n(t) =n and e =O. Then, (3.4) and (3.5) 
to (2.14) and (2.15) where the latter corresponds to all the necessary 
conditions that satisfy the stationary monetary equilibrit111 given that 
fertility is exogenous. This result does not follow when fertility is 
endogenous. Proposition 1 below establishes that the competitive Golden 
Rule is not identical to the social planner Golden Rule allocation. 
Proposition 1: The Stationary Monetary Equilibrium (SME) is not the 
Planner Stationary Allocation (PSA). 
7 
As such,the problem that Deardorff mentioned can be easily eliminated 
in this model by as&UfflPtions on the utility and the production functions. 
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Proof: To prove the above proposition we demonstrate that the S}!E is not 
the same as the PSA by comparing the first order necessary conditions at the 
stationary allocation for problems (2.3) and(3.l). Here the competitive 
economy is on the golden rule. Hence, equations (2.10) and (2.11) are 
identical to (3.4) and (3.5), respectively. Evaluating the PSA using the 
-cS"HE a11ocation we get· wP -- f (-:-ck) - (nc + u1:)-:-ck • Then, T = g from (3.2), 
':":'C(3.3) and (2.4) and (2.5) at the stationary state. Divide (3.6) by v and1 
using (2.10)- (2.13) we.get that the SME and the PSA are identical if and only if 
-c-i< + __i:__ + -f(°i<)+(;-c+ o)~ + f(~) + (1-o)'i< = 0, that is __g__ = 0 . 
l+nc 1 + nc 1~ 
This contradicts ~ > 0 for the SME, and at this allocation equation 
(3.6) is equal to 
~ 
3(3.7) -- 0 , 
~ 1 
where the inequality holds since the first two terms sum to zero from (2.12). 
Q.E.D. 
-c0 bserve that there exists a "knife edge" case where g = 0 such that the ecor 
my is on the Golden Rule and the stationary non-monetary equilibrium (SNME) and the 
PSA are the same. Furthermore, at the SME the transfer (T ) of the planner is positive, 
and in the absence of endogenous fertility the PSA and the SME are identical. 
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"'c ~ In our model, the SNME is characterized by f'(kc) > n + 6, (gc = 0), while 
f'(kp) = nP+ 6 characterizes the PSA. Thus, the SNME does not have the same 
solution as the PSA. ,·Observe that the Diamond framework exhibits the same 
P '"'cresult. Furthermore, if we impose on the planner problem that W • W 
and the transfer T is not permitted to be negative, i.e., no tax on the 
old, (3.5) may hold as strict inequality and then T • o. The relationship 
between the SNME and the PSA is summarized by the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: If a SNME exists, it satisfies the PSA subject to a non-
__J) "'cnegativity constraint on T and w- • W • 
Proof: At the SNME g 
"'c = 0 • at the PSA and 
observe that T • O, since the constraint~ (3. 2) and (3. 3) are satisfied 
at the SN11E. From (2.10) and (2.11) we get that 
1 + ~c 
"'cThen conditions (3.4) and (3.5) are satisfied.8 Divide (3.6) by V we get
1 
e = 0 • 
Hence, the SNME satisfies ·(3.4) (3.6) and is equivalent to the PSA. Q.E.D. 
8condition (3.5) is statisfied as an inequality since T • O. 
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Notice that the constraint that the transfer T be positive does not 
affect Proposition 1. Moreover, we have not demonstrated that the planner's 
solution with the restriction that T > 0 implies satisfaction of the 
optimality criterion that would take into account the welfare of generations 
that are not on the stationary path. Thus, Proposition 2 does not i11ply 
that the SNME is optimal. 
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that under certain restrictions on the 
social planner, that allocation and the stationary competitive equilibrium 
differ only when the Golden Rule is satisfied. The monetary 
equilibrium is characterized by positive transfers across generations while 
in the non-monetary economy there is~ direct trade between different 
generations besides that which arises from the existence of the labor market. 
It is interesting to note that the labor market which also connects the 
different generations does not imply any divergence between the planner and 
the competitive markets. Next we suggest an intervention policy in the asset 
market which supports a decentralized equilibrium that is identical to the 
planner at the steady state. Additionally, we show that fertility in the 
competitive economy (SHE) is higher than the social planner's optimum 
fertility level. 
An Intervention Policy 
The potential non-optimality of competitive markets in overlapping 
generations models, the over-accumulation of capital, serves as a justi­
fication for a social security program (Samuelson, 1958), as an explanation 
20 
for valued fiat money issued by the government (Wallace, 1980) and as a 
justification for a welfare improving role of national debt (Diamond, 1965). 
All of these suggested programs remove the inefficiency of the competitive 
allocation by introducing a costless feasible mechanism that transfers goods 
across generations ~ith a rate of return that is equal to the market rate, 
i.e., the population growth rate. Here, we have abstracted from the standard type 
of inefficiency by introducing a paper asset that is identical to fiat money. 
Furthermore, when fertility is subject to choice, as we have already shown, 
the equivalence of planner and competitive allocations cannot be achieved 
by introducing a fixed stock of fiat money or a pay-as-you-go social security 
program. In fact, the program must tie the return on the saving-transfer 
decision to the chosen fertility rate, n. 
Consider a voluntary self-financing social security program 
administered by the govemment that promises a return on savings during 
the working period that is identical to the individual specific fertility 
rate, n. It is straightforward to verify that this program will give 
rise to a SE that is identical to the PSA. To see this, rewrite (2.4) and 
(2.5) as 
(3 • 8) Cl ( t) = H(t) - K(t + 1) - g ( t) - e ( 1 + n ( t + 1) ) 
(3. 9) c
2
(t) = F(K(t+l), L(t+l)) - H(t+l)L(t+l) + (1-6)K(t+l) + (l+n(t+l)) g(t) 
21 
where g(t) now represents the voluntary contribution to the social security 
program by each of the young of generation t. A young person of 
generation t maximizes (2.3) subject to (3. 8) and (3. 9). The first-
order necessary conditions for SE are 
-V + V [f' (k) + 1 - 6] "' 01 2 
(3 • ll) < 0 with= if 0 
(3 • 12) = 0 
(3. 13) f (k) - kf' (k) - W = O 
Note that the SME now differs from the PSA if and only if (3.12) differs from 
(3.6) given that {3.13) is satisfied. However, substituting the solution 
to (3.10)- (3.13) into (3.6) with T • g , we get 
V,,_ - V, (e + k) ~ V,.,(8 + k(l -cS) + f'(k)) 
~ ~ ~ 
= 
which is i<lentical to (3.12). Thus, the social security program induces 
an equivalence between the SME and the PSA. 
An alternative policy would be to place a tax or subsidy on children 
financed by a lump-sum transfer between generations. Thus e in (3 .8) 
would be replaced by e + T where T is the per child tax or subsidy 
and the right hand side of (3. 9) would be augmented by T (1 + n) 2 • Such 
22 
a program would be identical in impact to the social security program 
previously discussed as can be seen by setting g(t) = T(l + n). An 
important difference, however, is that the optimal T would need to be 
known by the planner since such a program would not be voluntary. 
We have demonstrated that the SME is not identical to the planner 
solution and we have proposed a social security program that induces these 
allocations to be the same. The following proposition asserts that the 
SME is characterized by too few children and too much savings. Hence, our 
suggested program will increase fertility and reduce capital accumulation. 
Proposition 3: If the utility function is such that second order 
conditions for the PSA hold globally, then the SHE has 
a lower stationary rate of population growth than the PSA. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
The fact that t~e PSA has a higher stationary stock of capital 
per-capita, i.e., kp <re, is immediate from the golden rule condition 
that holds for both allocations. This result is due to the fact that the 
planner takes into consideration the direct effect of the fertility rate 
on the rate of interest while each young takes the rate of return on savings 
parametrically. As such the planner perceives a benefit from population 
growth that has no counterpart in the competitive economy. 
In the following section we consider the popular example of a log 
additive utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production function in order 
to show analytically the results of this section. 
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4. An Example 
In this section we analyze the monetary and non-monetary equilibria 
and the planner problem for the case of a log additive utility function and 
Cobb-Douglas production function. In this example the stationary equilibria 
of monetary and non-monetary economies arise immediately, that is, after only 
one period. We provide analytical solutions for the stationary competitive 
and planner allocations which can be used to demonstrate the validity of the 
propositions of the previous section. 
The utility function is given by 
(4.1) V • 
and the production function by 
(4.2) f(k) • Aka • 
Proceeding as in Section 2, assuming for convenience full depreciation 
of capital (6 • 1), the first order necessary conditions for the 
maximization problem of the decentralized economy are 
(4.3) 
(4.4) P(t+l) < 0 
BJ(4.5) + - 01 + n(t+l) 
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For a monetary equilibrium (ME) (4.4) is a strict equality while for 
a NME it is a strict inequality. Using (2.4) - (2.5) and (4.3) - (4.5), 
it can be shown that the equilibrium paths for capital per capita and the 
price of the paper asset must satisfy 
a 
AB3s(l- a)k(t) ) H (4.6) k(t+l) ( B + P(t) N(t) • s A(l - a)k(t) 
2 
The right hand side of (4.6) is merely the savings of generation t with 
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the fixed marginal propensity to save from income (Wt)s - Sl+B2+B3 
which is equal to A(l - a)k(t)0 • The left hand side of (4.6) shows the 
division of total savings between capital and the paper asset. 
Setting P(t) • O in (4.6) yields the equilibriu~ level of capical 
per capita for the NME fort~ 1, since k(l) is given. -Thus, 
(4. 7) 
Solving for the equilibrium levels of fertility, and first and second 





It is thus obvious that the SNME is reached immediately since both 
k(t+l) and n(t+l) are independent of t, for all t > 1. 
For a monetary economy Pt is positive. From inspection of 
a N(t)(4.6) it is readily seen that if P(t) takes the form yk(t) H , 
a stationary value of k is obtained. It is easy to show that there 
exists a y, which is only a function of the underlying parameters of the 
9
model, such that the stationary equilibrium is obtained fort~ 1 • 
Without presenting the algebra, the solutions for t > 1 are: 
8 ae
2(4.11) ~(t+l) • 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
exist it is necessary that 8 - a(8 + 2S2 + s3) > 0 •2 1 
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(4.14) 
where k(l) and n(l) are given as initial conditions. 
Note that in the Diamond framework the same example gives rise to 
a smooth path of infinitely many periods of convergence to the steady state. 
However, the endogeneity of fertility enables the economy to restore the 
steady state in one adjustment period. 
The planner stationary allocation for· this example can be obtained 
by solving (3.4) - (J.6) together with the feasibility constraint at the steady sta 
c2 10c1 + ffi + e(l + n) • f(k) - (1 + D)k , and is given by 
(4.15) 
(4.16) 




~ote that for a planner's solution to exist it is necessary that 
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Given these solutions the propositions of section 3 are easily 
demonstrated. Comparing (4.11) - (4.14) to (4.15) - (4.18), it is readily seen 
that the stationary monetary equilibrium is not the same as the planner 
allocation (Proposition 1). Furtqer, the number of children is less in 
the monetary equilibrium, i.e., 1 + ;c < 1 + np, as stated in Proposition 3. 
To see that it is only necessary to show that ~ > kp since the golden rule 
holds in both cases, i.e., (4.12) and (4.16) are the same. The difference 
between ~ (4.12) and kp (4.15) is positive if 
This is true if B2 - a(B1 + 262 + a3) > 0, which as noted is the 
condition for a monetary equilibrium to exist. As observed in the 
previous section, the two allocations differ because the return 
on the paper asset is not perceived by economic agents in c01J1petitive 
equilibrium as being related to their own fertility choice. Any single 
individual does not take into account the impact of an additional child 
on the rate of return to the paper asset from which all of the old benefit. 
The demonstration of Proposition 2 is also straightforward. Basically, 
it must be shown that the SNME satisfies (3.6), where it is recognized that 
T • 0 at the SNME and W is set at the competitive wage. Now (3.6) with 
V and f(k) given by (4.1) and (4.2) is equal to 
which upon substituting for the SNME as given by (4.7) - (4.10) reduce to zero. 
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Proposition 2, which states that the SNME will be equivalent to the 
planner allocation if the planner is restricted to pay the competitive 
wage and not permitted to tax the old, is thus seen to hold if it is also 
recognized that under these restrictions the golden rule is not a 
necessary condition for the planner problem. 
In order to complete the comparison between the planner and the 
competitive allocation it would be of interest to investigate whether the 
planner allocation is Pareto Superior to the competitive allocation using 
the optimality definition in section 2. If the planner allocation dominates 
the competitive allocation then the competitive equilibrium is obviously 
non-optimal. However, if the planner allocation does not dominate the 
competitive allocation i.e., if in the example of this section the initial 
old and/or the first generation are worse off in the PSA, then it might 
11reasonably be conjectured that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
11We have neither been able to find a numerical example of planner 
dominance nor a proof that the allocations are non-comparable. 
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5. Fertility and Economic Growth 
In this section we consider the extent to which the implications 
of the overlapping generations growth model with endogenous fertility as 
previously presented conforms to cross-country and times series observations 
on fertility and economic growth. We show,using examples, that in the 
steady state fertility and income per-capita may be negatively related 
even though children are normal goods and there is no child quality 
component,(Becker and Lewis, 1973). Competitive equilibrium conditions alone 
are sufficient to generate this result. We further show that in order to 
generate declining fertility with increasing per-capita income along the 
equilibrium path as recently observed for developed countries, additional 
assumptions are required. In particular, an extended model is presented in 
which the cost of children is made a function of the wage rate (endogenous) 
incorporating therefore a time cost to rearing children (Becker, 1960, 
Willis, 1973~ Razin and Ben-Zion, 1975). Simulations of that model which 
can replicate the observed phenomenon are presented. 
Consider first the steady state relationship between fertility and 
income per capita. Assume that cross-country differences are best 
approximated by steady state comparisons or that the paths to the steady 
state are sufficiently smooth so as to have the same properties. In the 
case of a stationary monetary equilibrium, the golden rule condition given 
by (2.14) must be satisfied. It is immed~ate that, except for production 
function differences (or (differences in 6), economies with high capital 
per capita must have low fertility, and this results solely from the golden rule 
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coMpetitive equilibrium condition. For example, economies with a hi:>her 
cost of children (e) will have fewer children and higher incor.?e per capita 
even though, at the individual level savinr,s could he independent of e. 
p (t+l)
This is easily seen from (2.10) and (2.11) in which is set p (t) 
equal to some consta_nt that as far as the individual is concerned is 
p (t+l)
unrelated to the population growth rate. _Then, f'(k) = can be p (t) 
solved for k in terms of the given rate of return to the paper asset, 
which for the individual is independent of the cost of children. There is, thus, 
an important distinction between partial and r,eneral equilibrium results in this 
case. 
In the stationary non-monetary equilibriun, the golden rule no longer 
is satisfied, and it is, therefore, not clear how fertility will be related 
to per-capita income in general. For the log additive utility function, the 
steady state solution for capital per capita and for fertility are given h;' 
(4.7) and (4.8). It is still true that k and n are inversely related 
across economies differing only in the cost of children. However, in constrast 
to the SME, no general results emerge when preference parameters differ. 
These results illustrate poten_tial explanations for cross-sectional 
differenceS in inco□ e and fertility. Interpretation of the time series 
observations requires .at analysis of the non-steady state features of the 
model. It is not necessary to solve completely for the decentralized 
equilibrium in order to derive s0111e basic results. In particular, 
if the utility function is contemporaneously separable, it is easy to see 
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from (2.8) that fertility and first-period consumption nust move topether:2 
If first period consumption is normal, then fertility will also be positively 
correlated with income per capita alonp, the equilibrium path. Since on the 
path k(t) is predetermined at t+l, higher levels of k(t) and therefore 
of per-capita income at t could only produce lower levels of fertility if 
children were inferior. Notice that this argument is applicable both to 
monetary and non-monetary equilibrium paths. In the steady state, however, 
since k(t) • k(t+l), income per capita is predetermined and this difference 
19between the steady state and the path is crucial. 
A simple extension of the model is to assume that raising children 
requires time, and therefore, that the cost of children is a function of 
the endogenously determined wage rate. In order to consider a multi-period 
path from any initial condition to a steady state, we assume an addilog 
utility function of the form 14. 
The cost of children e is replaced in (2.4) and (2.5) by e0 + e W(t),1 
where is the fixed cost of a child as in previous sections and e is1 
the fraction of time required for each child. We consider only the non­
monetary equilibrium path • 
1t>ifferentiating (2.8), 
13.rt leisure is an argument in the utility function income would no longer
be predetenained. 
Recall that the log additive utility function yields an i1a111ediate steady state. 
14 
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Table 1 reports several simulations of the model for alternative 
andvalues of and It turns out that the difference between s3 
is important to the shapes of the equilibrium paths so that s is also3 
onlyvaried in some of the simulations. The first two simulations assume a 
goods cost of children 
one smaller than •s2 
• 0) for two values of s , one larger and(e1 3 
In case A where s is larger than s2, n and3 k 
cycle in the same direction, while in case B, where s is less than s2,3 
n and k move in the same direction which depends upon the initial value 
of k. In case c, is lowered and e , is raised and thee0 1 
propensity for n and k to move in opposite directions increases. 
In this case capital per worker increases throughout the equilibrium path 
while fertility first increases, reaches a piateau and then decreases until the 
steady state is reached. This example seems to be broadly consistent 
with the observations on fertility and economic growth as they are 
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summarized by Kuznets. In the final example, case D, there is only a time 
cost to raising children and in that case capital per capita rises and 
fertility falls throughout. These examples demonstrate that almost any 
set of equilibrium paths of fertility and income per-capita, including 
cycles, are consistent with a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium. 
Hence, no general propositions are feasible for this model. 
15
Obviously some elements of the demographic transition are still missing 
in this model, e.g. child mortality (Schultz, 1976), but can be 
incorporated in straightforward fashion. 
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Given the time cost of children in this model, as capital accumulates 
and the wage rate then rises, there is a substitution away from children 
and towards goods consumption. At the same time, as income per-capita grows, 
the demand for children increases given the structure of preferences in 
this example. The path that actually arises depends upon the relative 
strengths of these two effects which are directly related to the relative 
magnitudes of the fixed goods cost and the time cost of raising children, 
16
(Razin and Ben-Zion, 1975). Having characterized the various alternative 
equilibrium trends in a non-monetary economy, it does not seem that the 
17existence of a valued paper asset would alter the general results. 
16
This can be shown for any separable utility function. Differentiating (2.8) 
with e replaced by e + e W(t), and using (2.9), yields0 1 
d(ld~(~~c+l)) • - k(t)!::k(t)) {el(l + n(t))Vl + (eO + el(l+n(t))W(t))Vll}• 
The first term inside the brackets corresponds to the substitution effect 
and the second to the income effect. 
17 
However, the monetary path is not easily solved. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
When population is endogenously detemined within a neo-classical 
growth model, there exists a stationary population growth rate that is 
supported with stationary consumption per-capita. This steady state may 
or may not be on the Golden Rule; if it is on the Golden Rule, it does not 
correspond to the social planner stationary allocation. Moreover, the 
social planner Golden Rule allocation is characterized by a higher population 
growth rate and a lower level of capital per-capita in comparison to the 
competitive Golden Rule allocation. 
The competitive perfect-foresight equilibrium growth model 
we have presented was shown to generate patterns of population and 
income per-capita growth that are consistent with recent time-series 
evidence on developed countries and with international cross-sectional 
evidence. An important, yet in our model omitted, ingredient to 
population change, particularly in less developed countries, 
is that of infant and child mortality. If birth rates respond to 
~Au~~uuu~ mo~~ali~y of children or if their mortality is itself part of 
the household decision process, then the model as formulated does not 
capture the complete story. In particular, it has been argued that the 
demographic transition from high fertility and high mortality environments 
to low fertility and low mortality environments is due in part to 
(exogenous) permanent declines in mortality. A natural extension of 
our framework would include child mortality in the model in part t_o 
ascertain whether the observed pattern in income per-capita, fertility 
and mortality can be replicated. 
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Given our conclusion that the competitive stationary equilibrium has 
fewer children than the planner allocation, one might wonder whether it is 
possible in growth models with endogenous fertility to generate a competitive 
equilibrium with "too many" children. The main justification for the view 
that the world is, in this sense, overpopulated seems to stem from the Malthusian 
argument concerning fixed factors of production (land) which leads to 
decreasing consumption per-capita with increasing population. In fact, if 
one includes in our model a fixed factor, then it is easy to demonstrate that 
there does not exist a stationary allocation where capital per-capita is 
18 
constant, except when population is constant. Hence, in a stationary 
allocation, capital per-capita must grow to offset diminishing returns, i.e., 
it is required that there be land augmenting technical change, which is 
feasible only if there is not a high rate of depreciation. Most studies 
assume an exogenous rate of land augmenting technical progress which is 
equivalent to assuming growth without investment. In particular, if there 
is no capital in the model, it follows immediately that the competitive 
equilibrium leads to the Malthustian prediction for consumption per-capita. 
However, analyzing the optima and equilibria of economies with a fixed 
factor of production as suggested above is beyond the scope of this paper. 
This appears to us to be an important issue, although it is not clear that 
our main results would be altered. 
Let the constant returns to scale aggregate production function 
be F(K(t), L(t), A), where A is fixed. 
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APPE!IDIX A 
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 3 in the text. 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Although the SME is not optimal, its solution set does satisfy 
(3 .4) and (3 .5). However (3 .6) evaluated at the SME is too large since 
it reduces to 
since g > 0. 
Moving from the SME to the PSA must leave (3.4) and (3.5) unchanged but 
must reduce (3.6), where (3.4) - (3.5) are evaluated at the SME. 
Thus, the following conditions, obtained by total differentiation 
of the necessary conditions for the PSA, must hold. 
2a v a2v(A.I) 0dk + akaT dT + akan dn = 
(A.2) = 0 
(A. 3) < 0 
2where a v is evaluated at the SME. 
axay 
Solving (A.l) and (A.2) for dk and dT in terms of dn and 
substituting into (A.3) yields the following inequality eA"Pression, 
A2 
(A.4) dn < 0 
where IA I = I av I and where is the <leterminant of the matrix 
~xay 
ndobtained by deleting the 2~d row and 2 column. If the second-order 
conditions for the PSA hold at the SME, then IA I < 0 and jA22 1 > 0. 
Thus, dn > O, i.e., the SME is characterized by too few children. Since 
n and k raust be inversely related, it must also be true that the SME 
is characterized by too much savings. 
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